Strategy Research Project

CSS MODULARITY – THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

BY

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CSS MODULARITY – THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

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CSS MODULARITY – THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

The Army Modularity movement that created the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) greatly enhanced the capabilities of the BCT by creating cohesive teams that trained, deployed and fought together at the Brigade Level. Based upon the success of the BCT concept, Task Force Logistics designed modular Sustainment Brigades. However, the effort only encompassed the Sustainment Brigade Headquarters, and failed to "package" Battalion and below units. As a result, when the Army implemented combat service support (CSS) modularity, brigades and battalions were torn apart during the sourcing process and deployed piecemeal. This has had the opposite effect on unit training and cohesion that the proponents of modularity originally intended. By making basic changes to the sourcing, pre-deployment training and resourcing process the negative effects of modularity can be reduced.

The movement to modularity began 1995 when the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published TRADOC Pamphlet 525-68 titled Concept for Modularity. This document served as the basis for a transformation to the organization that in ten years would ultimately result in the wholesale reorganization of the Army. In this pamphlet, the authors forwarded the concept that the fall of the Berlin Wall had resulted in changes to the National Military Strategy. The Army was moving away from large forward deployed and mature theaters to an expeditionary force that relied on force projection to exercise combat power. Under modularity, in order to maximize strategic lift, it would no longer be necessary for commanders to deploy whole units when they were not necessary to accomplish the mission. Modularity would "enable the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) to package the correct balance of

combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units to properly execute a combatant commander's (CCDR's) mission.[1]

As the modularity concept matured, units (primarily combat support and combat service support) were reorganized with the ability to split into smaller modular pieces. In January of 2004, with demands for forces to fight two wars placing increasing stress on the Army, the modularity movement went mainstream. The Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Peter Schoomaker announced a major initiative to restructure the Army from a Division Based Army (the so called Army of Excellence or AOE) to a more modular Army based upon the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). This change sent shock waves through the Army as Soldiers who were raised on the AOE organization questioned that the new structure would diminish the ability of the Division and other senior headquarters to command and control "their" formations in training and combat. At the same time, brigade commanders found themselves with increased power and responsibility for resourcing and training their units for combat. Original estimates placed the cost for Army modularity at $21 Billion, but as the modularity movement swept over the Army those costs grew enormously, with recent estimates stating that the Army will spend more than $140 Billion on modularity through FY13.[2] In order to execute this fundamental change the Army went to great lengths to modify its organizational culture. In doing this, key embedding and reinforcing mechanisms were utilized which served to expedite the transformation to Army culture. These mechanisms have had wide ranging effects, both positive and negative.

In the article, "Organizational Culture; Applying a Hybrid Model to the U.S. Army", Gerras, Wong and Allen define embedding mechanisms as those mechanisms that

place the assumptions into an organization.[3] In short, the author's propose that in order to change the culture of an organization you must first change the way it looks at an issue until it is not a "new" way to evaluate but it has become "the way it always is." The authors further define reinforcing mechanisms as those mechanisms that merely support the embedded assumptions.[4] In order to make the transformation to modularity "stick", senior Army leaders made several changes to systems or procedures that were clearly attempts to utilize embedding and reinforcing mechanisms. Many of these embedding and reinforcing mechanisms are clearly linked together where the reinforcing mechanism supports the more important embedding mechanism. The fact that this change has been executed while simultaneously fighting two wars is monumental and speaks to the strength of the embedding and reinforcing mechanisms that were used. Now that the brigade culture has taken hold in the Army it will be difficult to reverse. While the Army has been largely successful in creating the brigade centric Army, there are some drawbacks associated with this cultural change. Constrained resources, both personnel and budgetary, has led some to warn that we are heading to an Army of the haves and have not's. As a majority of the resources and institutional attention and energy are being focused on the BCT, those units that are not part of the BCT become resource starved and ignored. This can have a negative effect on the Army's attempt to change the culture which could potentially slow down the cultural change. In addition, some senior leaders have begun to express concern about the unintended results of the modularity on Soldiers and leaders. As one senior leader stated – "we've broken the link between the Division Commander and the Brigade Commander." [5] In that the increased turbulence felt during the beginning and end of the

Army Force Generation process could potentially have an effect on readiness and Soldier care.

ARFORGEN Overview

Along with the new culture of brigade level organization, it was necessary to fundamentally change the process in which units were sourced for deployment. To capture and manage this process the Army developed the Army Force Generation Process which is commonly referred to as the ARFORGEN. Under ARFORGEN the modular brigade (along with other units) is now tracked through its entire lifecycle; from formation (early units), sourcing for deployment, pre-deployment training, deployment and redeployment. This has allowed the Army to directly control the resources that are allocated to the brigade throughout its lifecycle and serves as another example of the embedding mechanism of how leaders allocate resources. It is important to note that while the ARFORGEN has now been applied to all deployable Army units, it was originally designed to support the transformation from a divisional centric Army to a brigade centric Army. This is clearly an example of the reinforcing mechanism of "organizational systems and procedures."[6]

To fully understand the ramifications of the echelon above brigade modularity movement we must first examine the origins and implementation of the ARFORGEN model. The model was initially developed as a response to the growing demand for forces to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Undertaken in 2005 as a pilot program, the ARFORGEN was officially implemented in 2006 as the formal model for Army force management.[7] The ARFORGEN replaced the old force management process which was designed to support the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) which itself had been replaced by the Global Force Management

Allocation Process. Early in the war, it became clear that the current force management system was inadequate to support the incredible demand for forces. In addition, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield was insisting that individual units be deployed only when needed and not as a part of a larger force package.[8] For example, Divisions were not selected for deployment and deployed enmass, they were deployed piecemeal as needed. For these reasons it was necessary to develop a new method of sourcing units for combat. As a result, the Army created the ARFORGEN process as a "system" to manage and track units as they moved through the pre-deployment selection, notification, training, deployment and redeployment phases of a unit lifecycle. The intent of the ARFORGEN was to provide commanders and planners with a tool which they could use to "manage" units.

The basic phases of the ARFORGEN include three distinct steps or stages. First units are in the Reset/Train phase when they have either returned from deployment or they are newly activated. During this phase the unit receives new personnel and equipment, sends Soldiers to individual training and performs necessary maintenance on existing equipment. Once the unit attains a predetermined level of readiness the unit enters the ready phase of the ARFORGEN. During this phase unit training continues, additional personnel are assigned and major exercises are planned and conducted. It is during this phase that the unit is sourced and notified for deployment. The Ready phase ends when the unit conducts its final pre-deployment validation exercise, loads and ships its organic equipment and makes it final preparations for deployment. The final phase of the ARFORGEN is the Available phase where units are deployed (if previously selected) to conduct missions. It is important to note that units that are not

notified for deployment in the Ready phase remain in the Available phase for an unspecified duration.[9]

By design the ARFORGEN was focused on building the capabilities of the Brigade Combat Team, it was later applied to the remainder of the force as the Army looked for a way to "institutionalize" the process of managing forces.[10] As a result of BCT modularity, combat brigade commanders do not have to worry that their formations will be torn apart by the deployment cycle – they retain most of their key enabler units as they are now organic to their formations. For non-BCT units the opposite is true – units are torn apart at will, with teams, platoons and companies routinely deployed to combat with little if any regard to their home-station parent unit relationships. This has a negative effect on unit cohesion, destroys unity of command and seriously hampers leadership development of our junior officers.

Unity of Command

One of the enduring tenants of Army culture is the nine principles of war. One of the key principles that effects operations at the tactical, operational and strategic level is the principle of unity of command. Army Field Manual 7-0 defines unity of command as follows, "Applying a forces's full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective. Cooperation may produce coordination, but giving a single commander the required authority is the most effective way to achieve unity of effort."[11] While most relate unity of command to single unit formations, it is a much larger issue when it is applied to multiple formations of Soldiers and units. This paper forwards that by design, the current modular structure as it applies to echelon-above-brigade (EAB) CSS forces violates this key principle of war on a daily basis. By failing

to build key relationships prior to deployment by shared collective training and routine day to day contact, unity of command of a non-BCT unit is undermined. While the skeptic will note that the current system of sourcing is performing well, we must take into account that units are deploying to well developed theaters where there is time to conduct "in stride" team-building and cohesion. The true test of modularity will be when modular CSS units deploy to an austere, undeveloped theater. It is under these circumstances that the full effects of not knowing how key leaders will react will become fully known. Modularity has not been widely tested under these circumstances as the initial phases of both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom were executed by pre-modularity CSS formations and units.[12]

History is full of examples of how much emphasis key strategic leaders have placed on achieving unity of command by stabilizing leaders (and units) within the force. During World War II, the commander of the famed 82nd Airborne Division, then Major General Matthew Ridgeway so believed in the power of unity of command that he stipulated that combat casualties were the only way leaders would change – until the war was over. This policy resulted in cementing early on, those relationships that ultimately contributed greatly to the unit's success on the battlefield.[13] Following this thought, the entire premise of the BCT modularity movement was that of achieving unity of command during entire ARFORGEN cycle - preparation for deployment, deployment and post deployment. Numerous BCT commanders have commented on the positive effects the BCT modularity has had on unity of command within their formations. Some have furthered the thought that BCT commanders must take special steps to ensure that team building exercises are completed during pre-deployment to solidify and further

build the teams *within their own organic formations*.[14] How can something that is so important be completely overlooked in EAB CSS modularity?

By design, EAB CSS units are split apart for deployment. Although CSS modularity has resulted in the consolidation of CSS assets above the Brigade level – the teams, platoon, companies and battalions that are actually conducting the operations are by design a fragmented force. The ARFORGEN process has totally broken the link within and between EAB CSS organizations. Realizing this, former Commander of the Combined Arms Support Command, then MG Mitchell H. Stevenson commented in an article in Army Sustainment magazine.

> However, all need to understand that, through the ARFORGEN process, sustainment brigades are not likely to deploy in support of the division commander from whom peacetime TRO (Training Resourcing Oversight) comes. Similarly, sustainment brigades are not likely to deploy with the Combat Sustainment Support Battalions (CSSBs) they command and control at home station.[15]

This quote speaks to the extent that unity of command is broken on by the ARFORGEN process on a routine basis with no consideration to habitual support or command control relationships.

Effects on Unit Cohesion

Throughout history there have been numerous studies that examine why Soldiers fight. Many of the studies come to the conclusion that cohesion is a major factor that determines how well a unit will perform in combat.[16] In a study of Iraqi Freedom veterans many Soldiers commented on how pre-deployment training strengthened their units which positively affected battlefield performance. As one Soldier commented, "going out and constantly training together, NTC rotations… We are together every day for the majority of the day, 5 days a week. You are going to start knowing what ticks

people off, what makes them happy, what you need to do to work with them. Eventually a bond is going to form".[17] While the majority of these studies revolve particularly around small unit formations, it is safe to assume that some of the same tenants that effect small unit dynamics will apply to larger formations. In other words, what makes smaller units successful will also make larger formations successful. In building the modular BCT, great steps were taken to build a force package that allowed the BCT to train, deploy and fight as a complete team, maintaining unit cohesion at the Brigade level as much as possible.

At the beginning of the modularity movement the Army implemented a concept of unit manning in order to increase the effectiveness of the BCT. In explaining the concept, the Honorable Reginald J. Brown, who was serving as the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated that "The unit manning system is designed to decrease personnel turbulence and set conditions for increasing cohesion, readiness and combat effectiveness."[18] While the unit manning system was abandoned several years later particularly because of the demands on the force, it is still important to evaluate the importance that was placed on improving unit cohesion at the Brigade level. Through these examples, it is clear that Army senior leaders by design defined unit cohesion as a BCT- level imperative. Stated another way, for the BCT, unit cohesion applies to the entire 5,000+ Soldier Brigade.

In contrast, consider unit cohesion as it applies to the non-BCT CSS modular force. While it is possible to maintain excellent unit cohesion within the small, independently deploying teams, platoons and companies, challenges arise when these small units arrive and serve together on the battlefield. For the non-BCT modular force,

unit cohesion is defined at a much lower echelon as units are trained and deployed at company level and below. Even battalion and brigade level headquarters are, for the most part, independently trained and deployed. As such, unit cohesion is determined to be important at company level and below and is secondary to the ability for the modular force to "plug and play."

Effects of Modularity on the Non- BCT Force

The effects of modularity on the EAB CSS force come in many different forms. Increased personnel turbulence, breaking of traditional support relationships and training challenges are all symptoms of the stress that is generated by modularity and the ARFORGEN process. But perhaps the most potentially damaging long-term effect of the modular CSS formation is on our development of junior leaders – particularly company commanders. Breaking the force has a profound effect on young commanders by degrading and destroying the key developmental relationship between a company commander and his or her battalion commander. When a company is sourced for deployment under ARFORGEN, they are for the most part sourced as a separate unit. The company's parent battalion headquarters is either not sourced for deployment or the headquarters is sourced for a different location in theater or to an entirely different theater. This situation places the company commander in a position where he or she has multiple battalion commanders during his or her command tenure. Given the time that it takes to develop effective commander-to-commander relationships, moving from one commander to another is detrimental to the company commander's development. One sustainment brigade commander illustrates this point with the following.

> I have a company commander that had five different battalion commanders during her 24 months in command. She took command under the first battalion commander. That battalion commander changed command within the first few months (second battalion commander). Then, her unit deployed to Iraq, thus fell under battalion commander number three. Her battalion commander conducted their RIP/TOA with battalion commander number four. Once she redeployed her battalion commander from home station was deployed, so she fell under commander number five. The saying "train as you fight becomes misleading… this particular commander trained under the first battalion commander, but then had to adjust each time to a new battalion commander… requiring the company commander to now adjust to new leadership styles, standards, etc . . .. It's a constant change for these young officers and they just hope they will do well every time their leadership changes.[19]

The above example illustrates the challenges that young company commanders are currently facing. Another challenging factor is that company commanders are younger and have far less time in service now versus the pre modularity/ARFORGEN reorganization. According to data supplied by the Army Human Resources Command a quick snapshot reveals that the CPT taking command in 2010 had an average of 38 months of service when taking command, this is down from an average of 67 months in 1996. Since the beginning of 2001 the average time in command has dropped from 25 months down to 19 months.[20] Couple multiple battalion commanders together with a less experienced company commander and you have a recipe for disaster. The Army has recognized the challenges that our young officers are facing. When discussing some of the challenges that modularity has placed on junior Army leaders, MG Stevenson stated "nor are CSSB's likely to deploy with all of their subordinate companies. This makes it critically important to know how to quickly build relationships with a new higher headquarters and with new customers. It's essential for the sustainment brigade commander to recognize this and then to teach and mentor CSSB and company commanders on how to build these relationships."[21]

Another equally disruptive effect of modularity is its effect on mission once deployed. As the system is currently designed, the EAB sustainment brigade commander can expect that he or she will meet the majority of their subordinate commanders only once they arrive in theater, this is a critical flaw in the ARFORGEN in how it applies to EAB units. The ARFORGEN does not have a process that mandates or requires EAB CSS units to conduct any collective training with their deployed task organizations prior to their actual deployment. The sustainment brigade is only required to conduct a validation exercise for their brigade headquarters. This has been identified as a critical shortcoming by numerous sustainment brigade commanders during post deployment after action reviews. It is important to highlight that a majority of sustainment brigade commanders surveyed took steps to mitigate this through their own personnel initiative, holding commanders conferences, conducting Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) exercises, etc.[22] The fact that the problem is widely recognized but is totally neglected by the ARFORGEN process highlights a significant shortcoming in the system. One former sustainment brigade commander commented on the challenge.

> The issue of sustainment organization modularity and their deployment into theater also conflicts with the Army goals regarding certain key elements of leadership and training. The elements of unity of command, unity of effort, multi-echelon pre-deployment training, staff/team building and leadership mentoring are all aspects that our sustainment commands don't get the benefit of during our home station training prior to deployment.[23]

Once those units arrive in theater the sustainment brigade and subordinate battalions must manage transitions as units on different cycles deploy and redeploy. As a result, the EAB CSS unit is constantly turning over while conducting combat

operations. It is normal for a modular sustainment brigade to conduct in excess of 35 separate unit transitions during the course of a 12 month deployment – while the BCT conducts only one. Another way to state this is the sustainment brigade commander is constantly building his or her team – with each of his subordinate commanders potentially in different phases of the team.

Another significant challenge for the non-BCT modular unit is the equipment fielding process. As developed, the process that the Department of the Army (DA) uses to track pre-deployment equipment fielding is focused on the BCT and utilizes a "push" system where DA schedules fielding and training based upon the BCTs position in the ARFORGEN cycle.[24] By contrast, EAB sustainment brigades are pushed equipment and training only to the Brigade Headquarters level, subordinate units are not tracked in the same fashion. This creates a situation where EAB CSS units must attempt to "pull" resources from the DA. The challenge is made more difficult when the company or battalions higher headquarters sustainment brigade is either deployed or preparing for deployment on an entirely different cycle of the ARFORGEN.

A final challenge for the non-BCT CSS unit commander is planning, resourcing and synchronizing pre-deployment mission training. Currently the BCT enjoys priority for resourcing and scheduling at all Combat Training Centers and for the Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) programs. The Battle Command Training Program was restructured to provide mentorship and training directly to those BCT's that were preparing for deployment. These mentors (retired general officers) work directly with the BCT Commander, ensuring that the brigade is prepared for deployment. Sustainment brigade commanders are also assigned mentors during their pre-

deployment training process. The difference lies in the level of training that each organization receives. The BCT participates in collective training that incorporates all of their organic subordinate units to include their subordinate battalion headquarters. In contrast, the sustainment brigade exercise is focused on the brigade headquarters only – subordinate battalion headquarters are linked in at the discretion of the brigade commander. Since the majority of their subordinate battalions are in a different cycle of ARFORGEN there is little opportunity to foster cohesion that would stem from multi-echelon collective training. One sustainment brigade commander said when asked which are the biggest issues facing our forces in combat today. "Over Plug and Play… need down trace of organization to better conduct training, develop team building and camaraderie."[25] Nowhere in our current deployment preparation system for EAB CSS units is collective training mandated for the entire task organization.

Non-BCT units who are scheduled to deploy are forced to resource and plan their own training strategies based upon training guidance received in their deployment orders, past deployment experience or through other methods. The challenge with this system lies with the effect on the effect on the planning and resourcing of subordinate unit pre-deployment training when the parent battalion or brigade headquarters is deployed. As units are juggled around in the rear-detachment formation, pre-deployment training for an independently deploying section, platoon or company can easily take a back seat to the basic survival of the rear detachment.

A final and perhaps more difficult to measure effect of modularity is its effects on families and Family Readiness Group (FRG) operations. As a deployed non-BCT unit can have multiple units from multiple installations and components, each of which has a

family readiness group at home. Dissemination of information, casualty notification and other actions take on a whole new level of complexity when the deployed battalion formation is a piecemealed modular force. For example, one commander's battalion of 1,600 Soldiers was comprised of units from three CONUS and one OCONUS bases and reserve and national guard Soldiers from eight separate states.[26] Each one of these units represented a separate family readiness group whose leadership must attempt to develop information dissemination systems and learn to trust each other – all after they are deployed. When these factors are combined with junior company commanders (or junior NCO's leading separate teams), battalion and brigade headquarters deployed separately as the result of the ARFORGEN it sets the conditions for families to get disconnected from the very support system that the Army has invested so much to enhance.

Options for Change

History is replete with examples of commanders being willing to accept risk in support capability in order to maximize combat power available on the battlefield. Consider the recent surge of combat forces into Afghanistan; as the surge force matures, commanders are looking for ways to replace support troops with additional combat forces. No matter what the force mix, commanders will always push to reduce the amount of logisticians and deployed support staff before they cut into combat forces.[27] This reality makes it imperative the Army deploys the best possible support formations; this is why changing the process is required.

While there are many different options available to address the shortcomings of CSS modularity, three options warrant discussion and further study. All options must be able to be executed in an environment of zero growth, both to force structure and

deployed task forces. The first option is to develop distinct force packages based around the peacetime Sustainment Brigades (SB) and/or Expeditionary Sustainment Commands (ESC). This would require basic restructuring of the current sourcing process as it is not feasible to assume that United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) would be able to support a major overhaul of the sourcing process while at the same time identifying multiple units for overseas contingency operations. The basic premise of this option is to conduct an analysis of current and projected overseas requirements and then identify rotational units based on home station and habitual task organization. This will solve several of the systemic issues and shortcomings identified above. First, leader development will be greatly enhanced by the simple act of fixing responsibility for the resourcing and training for rotational units on a single commander. If the brigade commander knows that he is going to take his subordinate battalion and company commanders into combat, it is a fair bet that he will ensure that he devotes adequate time to their leader development prior to and during their deployment. This will enhance the brigade's ability to plan, resource and conduct pre-deployment preparation and training. Secondly, equipment fielding and compatibility issues will be much easier to address in force packaged units. Brigade logistics officers and fielding teams will be able to coordinate the resourcing and fielding of new equipment with greater ease as the deploying units will be packaged and easier to monitor. As a result, the fielding authorities will be able to focus their efforts on one Brigade and their associated down-trace units vice multiple brigade, battalions and companies. Finally, family readiness group cohesion will be greatly enhanced as key leaders will be able to form bonds and develop systems during pre-deployment preparation and training.

A second distinct option would be to standardize the Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) structure as much as possible to reduce turbulence to the force. A quick analysis of past and current OIF and OEF operations reveals that there are key companies that form building blocks for CSSB's. The majority of deployed CSSB's possess in their deployed task organization a sustainment maintenance company, a transportation capability, a field service company and a direct support supply company. These basic building blocks constitute the core capabilities necessary to conduct EAB operations. Standardizing CSSB structure would allow planners to select one unit with its associated down-trace units, constituting a capabilities package.[28] Other enabler units (ammunition, fuel, transportation, etc. . .) could be added to the task organization as required. This effort would address current shortcomings by fixing responsibility of the training and mentoring of companies and their commanders to potentially one battalion commander instead of three or four. In addition, training and fielding of equipment would be focused on one battalion headquarters and four subordinate companies vice one deploying battalion headquarters and four deploying companies along with their home-station battalion headquarters. Family readiness group activities would be greatly enhanced as deployed FRG's would be able to build off of the established home station FRG's.

A third option would be to fix responsibility for deployment training of down-trace units on the deploying headquarters at the time of notification of deployment. The majority of units receive their deployment notification at least six months prior to their actual deployment date. If FORSCOM included in the deployment order an annex that outlined the projected task organization for deployment and then fixed responsibility for

training subordinate units on the template deployed battalion or brigade level headquarters it would allow commanders the opportunity to build the team prior to deployment. As this option would constitute a major departure from current systems it would require the presence of an official FORSCOM order and significant support from commanders at every level. United States Army Reserve and National Guard units would be handled in much the same manner with training responsibility fixed upon their receipt of deployment orders. While this option would require the maximum amount of coordination by FORSCOM staffs, it would also offer maximum flexibility for planners to identify, mobilize and deploy forces. However, it would place additional responsibility on the deploying commander as he or she would be forced to balance the training and deployment preparation of their deployed task force while simultaneously providing support to their home station units. This option seems to be receiving some attention as recent reports from the field point to a sustainment community attempt to address some of these issues by hosting a sourcing conference with representation from the field which will attempt to synchronize deploying units in order to maintain unity of command.[29]

All three options can benefit from an overhaul of the non-BCT pre-deployment training requirement. Currently, each unit is required to conduct a “capstone” training event in order to certify the unit for deployment. Guidance is such that it is up to the individual commander to determine the structure, duration and content of the pre-deployment certification exercise. By utilizing a combination of local battle-command training center (BCTC) (if available), scripted exercises developed by the Sustainment Center of Excellence, effective training plans could be easily developed that support the

basic functions necessary for overseas operations. Force packaging units and including subordinates in pre-deployment training will greatly enhance unit cohesion and effectiveness of the entire deployed organization – not just the individual modular pieces.

Conclusion

It is clear from the amount of resources and effort placed into the modularity movement, that the culture of the Army has changed and modularity and ARFORGEN are here to stay. However, the Army has identified that there are issues with ARFORGEN especially as it relates to sustainment units.[30] Maintaining deployment parity between active and reserve forces while focusing on leader development requires the Army to choose the option that will best support the deployment requirements of the war fighter. For these reasons, the best option to solve this problem is to apply rigor to the ARFORGEN process by including deployment training guidance that focuses on building the team for non-BCT units into the actual deployment/mobilization orders process. This will allow sustainment brigade commanders to focus their efforts on their deploying forces, will foster team building and will assist in the pre-deployment training of the entire deployed task force. In addition, this option offers the ability for the sustainment brigade to track equipment fielding and training readiness of all units and with proper staff work could potentially offer opportunities for subordinate unit participation in both the BCTC training process and the theater Pre-deployment Site Survey (PDSS) program. Based upon the Army's combat success during the past decade of persistent conflict, it is clear that modularity has a proven track record of success. Applying minor changes to the EAB CSS ARFORGEN process can mitigate

some of the major effects of modularity on the EAB CSS structure and ensure that our logisticians remain ready and relevant well into the next century.

Endnotes

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